Dynamic systems theory (DS) provides tools for exploring how simpler elements can interact to produce complex psychological configurations. It may, as Lewis demonstrates, provide means for explicating relationships between two reductionist approaches to overlapping sets of phenomena. The result is a description of psychological phenomena at a level that begins to achieve the richness we would hope to achieve in examining psychological life as it is experienced and explored in psychoanalysis.

Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

Classic, influential study of Greek tragedy.

I survey the difficulties of several probabilistic views of non-deductive argument and of inductive probability and propose to explicate non-deductive reasoning in terms of rational preference. Following a critical examination of Popper’s allegedly deductive theory of rational preference, I draw upon the work of Popper and Rescher to present my view which includes: (i) the conjecturing of a set of alternative answers to or theories or hypotheses about the questions prompting the inquiry and (ii) the “reduction” of this set via (...) plausibilistic principles of rational preference. (shrink)

I survey the difficulties of several probabilistic views of non-deductive argument and of inductive probability and propose to explicate non-deductive reasoning in terms of rational preference. Following a critical examination of Popper’s allegedly deductive theory of rational preference, I draw upon the work of Popper and Rescher to present my view which includes: (i) the conjecturing of a set of alternative answers to or theories or hypotheses about the questions prompting the inquiry and (ii) the “reduction” of this set via (...) plausibilistic principles of rational preference. (shrink)

This non-technical, easy-to-read introduction to symbolic logic discusses truth-functional and predicate logic in a simple and concise manner. Emphasizes indirect proof of an especially simple form, while avoiding entirely conditional proof. Proof construction is taught by using: finished proofs; partially completed proofs in which the students are to supply missing justifications for lines of proof; and partially completed proofs in which the students are to supply the missing lines of proof, given their justifications. The difficult topic of symbolization of sentences (...) is presented in a quasi-mechanical way which stresses the recognition of standard form expressions. (shrink)

In this paper I take Hempel’s raven paradox as the claim that statements of the form ‘∼Ru v Bu’, ‘u is not a raven or u is black,’ confirm the hypothesis h ‘(x)(Rx → Bx)’, ‘All ravens are black.’ Although Hempel discusses this using a criterion of confirmation expressed wholly in terms of deductive logic (see 1965, pp. 35-9), it has become more common to articulate criteria of confirmation using concepts of probability and, in particular, to employ the positive relevance (...) criterion of confirmation which says that, given background knowledge k, (i) e confirms h if and only if P(h/e.k)>P(h/k); (ii) e disconfirms h if and only if P(h/e.k)shrink)

Approaches to Meaning in Music presents a survey of the problems and issues inherent in pursuing meaning and signification in music, and attempts to rectify the conundrums that have plagued philosophers, artists, and theorists since the time of Pythagoras. This collection brings together essays that reflect a variety of diverse perspectives on approaches to musical meaning. Established music theorists and musicologists cover topics including musical aspect and temporality, collage, borrowing and association, musical symbols and creative mythopoesis, the articulation of silence, (...) the mutual interaction of cultural and music-artistic phenomena, and the analysis of gesture. Contributors are Byron Almén, J. Peter Burkholder, Nicholas Cook, Robert S. Hatten, Patrick McCreless, Jann Pasler, and Edward Pearsall. (shrink)

In this valuable and interesting book, Quine gives us his current views on evidence, reference, meaning, intension, and truth. Viewing the problem of evidential support as that of specifying logical relations between the sentences of a theory and observation sentences, Quine presents a form of confirmational holism. Observation sentences are occasion sentences which are firmly and intersubjectively associated holophrastically with ranges of stimulations. Only testable sentences which directly imply observation sentences may be refuted by observation. All other testable sentences are (...) disconfirmed or retained only as components of larger blocks of sentences. Quine mentions, but does not develop, reasoning in support of hypotheses which uses background beliefs and "the technology of probability and statistics". (shrink)